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The implications of globalization and increased openness for optimal
monetary policy have been the subject of a rapidly growing literature.
1
In this paper, Richard Clarida uses the New Keynesian two‐country
model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) to partly address such ques-
tions. The paper focuses on the degree of trade openness. It does not ad-
dress the implications of financial globalization, which is arguably
an equally important feature of the current wave of globalization. The
Claridaetal.modelhasbecomeabenchmarkforstudyingtheinteraction
of monetary policy in a two‐country world. The model is extremely ele-
gant and allows seeing exactly what is going on. At the same time, it is
very stylized, focusing on the terms of trade as the main international
transmission channel.Internationalrisksharingisassumedtobeperfect.
In the second part of the paper, Clarida then performs an empirical anal-
ysis of recent Fed behavior. This exercise is in the spirit of Taylor’s (1993)
original analysis using “eyeball econometrics.” The main question asked
is whether the Taylor rule can fit recentFed behavior. Claridaarguesthat
globalizationmayhaveaffectedsomeofthenecessaryinputsforcalibrat-
ing a policy rule such as the equilibrium real interest rate and expecta-
tions of inflation. He therefore uses expectations data from financial
markets to overcome this problem. These expectations measures should
be immune to breaks and changes in regime that may plague the use of
traditional instrumental generalized method of moment estimation of
forward‐looking Taylor rules. The Clarida et al. model gives hints about
how openness may affect the optimal reaction coefficients in a Taylor
rule. It would therefore be useful to explore some of those hints in the
empiricalpartofthepaper.However,inthesecondpartthereactioncoef-
ficients in the closed‐economy Taylor rule are basically kept constant.
How does openness affect the optimal relative weight on output gap
versus inflation stabilization? In the stylized model of Clarida et al.
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978‐0‐226‐10732‐5/2009/2008‐0032$10.00(2002), the optimal weight depends on two key elasticities: the slope of
the Phillips curve (λ) and the elasticity of substitution between differ-
entiated goods (ξ). The slope of the Phillips curve is itself a negative
function of the degree of price stickiness and a positive function of
the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. The elasticity of
substitution is a negative function of the markup in the goods sector. In
Clarida et al.’s paper, the degree of openness (as captured by the pa-
rameter γ, the share of imported goods in consumption) affects only
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As discussed by Clarida, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is greater than one, the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output
falls with greater openness. This will tend to flatten the open‐economy
Phillips curve and reduce the weight on output gap stabilization. The
main channel of transmission is through deterioration in the terms
of trade. When σ > 1, the positive impact of a deterioration of the terms
of trade through producer wages and marginal cost is dominated by the
negative impact through labor supply. There is indeed quite a bit of evi-
dencethattheslopeofthePhillipscurvemayhaveflattenedoverthepast
two decades. The analysis by Clarida suggests that increased trade may
have been one contributing factor.
Could there be other channels? In particular, could the other param-
eters in equation (1) be affected by increased trade openness? In Clarida
et al. (2002), they are assumed to be exogenous. One hypothesis that
is not explored in the paper is whether globalization may increase the
degree of competition in the domestic goods market and thereby reduce
the markup. Sbordone (2007) has recently endogenized the degree of
competition in a model similar to the one used in this paper by allowing
the elasticity of substitution to depend on the number of firms. She finds
that higher competition due to trade will reduce the “pricing power” of
firms and the slope of the Phillips curve. This result goes in the same di-
rection as the channel analyzed by Clarida. However, after calibrating
the model, Sbordone finds that the effects are economically small. The
overall negative effect on the weight on output gap stabilization will,
however, also depend on the increase in the elasticity of substitution.
Razin and Binyamini (2007) also find that greater openness reduces the
Smets 150slope of the Phillips curve and increases the weight on inflation stabiliza-
tion and the reaction coefficient on inflation.
Similarly, one can ask whether increased trade will affect the degree
o fp r i c es t i c k i n e s s .T h e r ei ss o m ee v i d e n c et h a th i g h e rc o m p e t i t i o n
leads to reduced price stickiness (see, e.g., Bils and Klenow [2004] and
some of the evidence of the Inflation Persistence Network [Altissimo,
Ehrmann, and Smets 2006]). This will tend to go in the opposite direc-
tion of steepening the Phillips curve, as was also argued by Rogoff
(2006). In the end, the effect of trade on the slope of the Phillips curve
and the weight on output gap stabilization is thus an empirical ques-
tion. There is quite a bit of evidence that the slope of the Phillips curve
has fallen, but it remains unclear how much of this is due to globaliza-
tion rather than to other forces such as the establishment of credible
low‐inflation regimes.
An additional question is to what extent the reaction function param-
eters in a Taylor rule are affected by openness. Interestingly, in Clarida
et al. (2002), the slope of the Phillips curve has no impact on the reaction
coefficient to inflation in the optimal simple Taylor rule (eq. [30]). The
reason is that the higher weight on output due to the worse trade‐off is
offset by the higher cost of inflation as captured by the degree of price
stickiness. What matters is the slope of the IS curve. In Clarida et al.’s
paper, the effectiveness of monetary policy increases with trade through
the terms of trade channel. As a result, less of a reaction to inflation is
needed to stabilize output. Clearly, in more general models these results
maychange.Itwouldbenicetotestsomeoftheimplicationsoftheopen‐
economymicro‐foundedmodelsintheempiricalpartoncentralbankreac-
tion functions. Has the relative weight on inflation and output changed?
Is this due to globalization?
Another interesting question is whether trade openness changes the
equilibrium real interest rate and the relevant output gap. The flexible‐
price output gap that enters the open‐economy Phillips curve is quite a
bit different from the measured output gap used in the latter section
and depends on foreign output. Similarly, also the natural real rate de-
pends on foreign output growth.
Finally, Coenen et al. (forthcoming) analyze the gains from coopera-
tion in a calibrated United States/euro area model. They find that the
gains from cooperation are quite dependent on the degree of openness.
The gains are small: about 0.03% of steady‐state consumption for rela-
tively closed economies such as the United States and the euro area.
They become larger for more open economies: about 1% of steady‐state
Comment 151consumption if the home bias is reduced from 0.85 to 0.65. Moreover,
the main source of the gains is the markup shocks.
Let us now turn to the second part of the paper. The idea is nice: In
order to account for regime changes and structural breaks, let us use
financial market–based expectations to analyze whether the original
Taylor rule is still a good description of monetary policy in the United
States (and the euro area). Three comments are worth making regard-
ing the use of those market‐based expectations. First, to the extent that
we want to capture Fed policy, we want to have the Fed’s forecasts. It is
not clear that they will coincide with the markets’ expectations. It
would be nice to provide an explicit comparison between the central
bank’s forecasts and those of the financial market. Second, the forward
rates (i.e., the 5‐year‐forward 5‐year rate and the 5‐year‐ahead inflation
compensation) are only rough measures of expectations. Time‐varying
risk premia are potentially large, as indicated by some of the macro‐
finance literature. Third, what is the appropriate horizon for the inflation
forecasts entering a policy rule? Typically central bank forecasts extend
to 2–3 years. It is therefore not clear that the 5‐year‐ahead expectation is
a good measure.
Clarida’s figure 2 comparing the original Taylor rule with the actual
behavior of the federal funds rate is impressive. How can it be explained
that during most of the new millennium the federal funds rate was con-
sistently below the level suggested bythe original Taylor rule? Was there
a break? The most plausible explanation is a fall in the equilibrium real
interest rate, probably related to global forces such as the savings glut
that followed the Asian crisis of the late 1980s. However, his figure 3
shows that this is not the full explanation, since a large discrepancy re-
mains using a time‐varying measure of the market‐based expected real
equilibrium interest rate. Clarida further reduces the discrepancy by
doubling the reaction coefficient on the output gap. This is, however,
not what the Clarida et al. model would suggest. Moreover, it would
be nice to comparethis Taylor rule with one that uses the Fed’s own fore-
casts. Orphanides and Wieland (2008) find that using the real‐time
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) forecasts in the Taylor rule
does deliver a very good fit, including in the 2003–4p e r i o d( s e em y
fig. 1). Moreover, their estimate of the reaction coefficient on the output
gap is close to Taylor’s number of 0.5. In contrast, the reaction coefficient
to1‐year‐aheadexpectedinflationishigher.Amazingly,usingtheFOMC
forecasts also explains why the federal funds rate was kept low for a sus-
tained period in 2003–4.
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The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
1. SomekeyreferencesareGaliandMonacelli(2005),Rogoff(2006),RazinandBinyamini
(2007), Sbordone (2007), and Woodford (2008).
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